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The Winner Curse and Social Inefficiency: Double Whammy of R&D Tournament

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dc.contributor.author Mukherjee, Arijit en_US
dc.contributor.author Wang, Leonard F.S. en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2014-09-05T22:54:59Z
dc.date.available 2014-09-05T22:54:59Z
dc.date.issued 2011 en_US
dc.identifier.citation Journal of Technology Management & Innovation 6(4): 2011, p. 73-79 en_US
dc.identifier.other e0718-2724 es_CL
dc.identifier.other es_CL
dc.identifier.uri http://repositorio.uahurtado.cl/handle/11242/2152
dc.description.abstract In a R&D tournament setting with free entry and knowledge spillover, we show that the society would suffer from excessive entry and the patent holder would endure lower profits than non-patent holders because it bears the cost of commercializing and further technology development, while the other firms are beneficiaries of the spillover effects. This result is instructive to R&D and competition policy. en_US
dc.language.iso eng en_US
dc.publisher Universidad Alberto Hurtado. Facultad de Economía y Negocios es_CL
dc.rights Attribution 3.0 Unported
dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/
dc.subject R&D tournament en_US
dc.subject Excessive entry en_US
dc.subject Insufficient entry en_US
dc.title The Winner Curse and Social Inefficiency: Double Whammy of R&D Tournament en_US
dc.type Artículo es_CL


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