Una Aplicación de la Teoría de Two-sided Matching al Proceso de Admisión a las Universidades en Chile

dc.contributor.author	Roldán, Flavia	es_CL
dc.date.accessioned	2014-07-31T21:25:01Z
dc.date.available	2014-07-31T21:25:01Z
dc.date.issued	1998	es_CL
dc.description.abstract	This paper analyzes the National System of Admissions as the mechanism employed in Chile to match universities and students. This process has three stages. The first one allows matching which are individually rational. The second one is a centralized mechanism which allows stable matchings. The last one is a decentralized mechanism and its matching will not necessarily be stable. On the basis of these results, it makes some recommendation to reach stable matchings. This paper also studies situations in which the agents have no incentives to state their true preferences to the matchmaker.	en_US
dc.identifier.citation	Revista de Análisis Económico 13(2): 1998, p. 107-140	es_CL
dc.identifier.issn	0716-5927	es_CL
dc.identifier.other	eISSN 0718-8870	es_CL
dc.identifier.other		es_CL
dc.identifier.uri	http://repositorio.uahurtado.cl/handle/11242/1728
dc.language.iso	es	es_CL
dc.publisher	ILADES; Georgetown University; Universidad Alberto Hurtado. Facultad de Economía y Negocios	es_CL
dc.rights	Attribution 3.0 Unported
dc.rights.uri	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/
dc.subject.lcsh	Admisión a la universidad -- Chile	es_CL
dc.title	Una Aplicación de la Teoría de Two-sided Matching al Proceso de Admisión a las Universidades en Chile	es_CL
dc.type	Artículo	es_CL

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